Turkey, a key Middle East state, seeks to play a significant role in postwar Gaza.
Turkey’s aspirations are understandable. Its president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was instrumental in coaxing Hamas to accept the U.S.-brokered ceasefire, which seems to have ended the Israel-Hamas war in the Gaza Strip, but which is still very fragile. And Erdogan attended the recent conference in Sharm el-Sheikh that ratified the truce, which constitutes the first phase of a 20-point peace plan submitted by U.S. President Donald Trump.
To no one’s surprise, Israel opposes a scenario whereby Turkish security personnel would help oversee the ceasefire within the framework of a future international stabilization force. “I have very strong opinions on that,” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said recently when asked by reporters about it. “You want to guess what they are?”
Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar was more direct. He said that Israel will not accept the presence of Turkish troops in Gaza. “Countries that are ready to send armed forces should be at least fair to Israel,” he noted.
Observers who have followed the course of Israel’s mercurial relationship with Turkey in the past 15 years understand exactly what they mean.
Turkey — a resolute ally of Hamas — has often been hostile to Israel under Erdogan’s leadership. His hostility grew exponentially as the war in Gaza intensified.
Erdogan, an Islamist, denies that Hamas is a terrorist organization. It was not by chance that he refrained from condemning Hamas’ massacre in Israel on October 7, 2023, which resulted in the murder of some 1,200 people and the abduction of 251 Israelis and foreigners.
Shortly after the outbreak of the war, his antagonism escalated. He lowered the level of Turkey’s diplomatic relations with Israel and virtually severed all trade with it.
Furthermore, he accused Israel of committing genocide in Gaza, a patently false accusation, and maliciously compared Netanyahu to Adolf Hitler.
This was not the first time Erdogan had vented his fury at Israel.
In 2010, following the Mavi Marmara incident in the Mediterranean Sea, during which Israeli commandos killed nine Turks aboard a ship trying to break Israel’s siege of Gaza, he recalled Turkey’s ambassador in Tel Aviv and ordered Israel’s envoy in Ankara to leave.
He subsequently patched up relations with Israel, which had flourished after the 1993 Oslo accords. In 2018, he once more downgraded Turkey’s ties with Israel following tensions along Israel’s border with Gaza. Three years ago, he restored full relations with Israel. And in September 2023, he met Netanyahu, his nemesis, in New York City.
With the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war, Erdogan reverted to form, launching a series of bitter attacks against Israel. He thereby confirmed the thesis, held by many observers of Mideast politics, that Turkey’s bilateral ties with Israel are effectively bound up and ultimately beholden to Israel’s relations with the Palestinians in general and with the Palestinian Authority in particular.
Due to Erdogan’s animus, Israel’s relationship with Turkey — the only Muslim member of the NATO alliance — lies muddied and broken today. Turkey, under the authoritarian reign of Erdogan, appears far more interested in cultivating bonds with Hamas than in resolving his differences with Israel.
Indeed, Israel is certain that Turkey’s overarching objectives are two-fold: to help Hamas survive after its drubbing during the war, and to preserve its status as the ruling authority in Gaza.
Israel, supported by the United States and its Western European allies, has made it crystal clear that Hamas has absolutely no future in Gaza. Israel, rightly, is intent on disarming Hamas, demilitarizing Gaza and ensuring that Hamas can no longer govern Gaza again.
What this means, in practice, is that Turkey cannot be permitted to join the yet-to-be-formed Gaza stabilization force, which is expected to monitor the border, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, and to protect civilian infrastructure.
Turkey, as U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance said last week during a whirlwind visit to Israel, can play a “constructive role.” For example, Turkish construction companies can help in the rebuilding of Gaza, a monumental task. And Turkish disaster response teams can assist with search and rescue operations.
However, as Vance importantly added, the Trump administration will not force Israel to accept foreign troops from countries deemed to be unfriendly.
To his credit, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio went one step further, asserting that the proposed stabilization force must be composed of soldiers from nations that “Israel is comfortable with.”
Which, of course, is another way of saying that Turkish troops are not welcome in Gaza.
Israel has every right to call the shots regarding this crucial issue. Nothing less than its security is at stake here.
The situation could change if Turkey sincerely rehabilitates its relations with Israel, but there is no evidence thus far that Erdogan intends to take that progressive step.
The ball is in Turkey’s court.