President Donald Trump’s 20-point Gaza Strip peace plan, approved by the United Nations Security Council on November 17, has not advanced beyond its first and least difficult phase.
Its second and most problematic phase will not be addressed until 2026.
The plan is grounded in a ceasefire that ended the two-year Israel-Hamas war, which caused the deaths of some 70,000 Palestinian combatants and civilians and 476 Israeli soldiers.
During phase one, which has yet to be fully completed, Israel was supposed to release Palestinian prisoners and Hamas was obligated to turn over the last of the living and deceased hostages. While both sides have almost entirely honored this facet of the agreement, Hamas has yet to release the corpse of Ran Gvili, the last dead hostage.
In accordance with the truce, which went into effect on October 10, Israel currently occupies 53 percent of Gaza, while Hamas is in charge of 47 percent of it. The separate occupation zones are demarcated by the Yellow Line, which has been described as a “new border” by the commander of the Israeli army, General Eyal Zamir.
Under the second part of Trump’s plan, Israel is supposed to withdraw from the Yellow Line, which would then be patrolled by an international force that has yet to be assembled.
The ceasefire has been wobbly, having been punctuated by constant eruptions of violence. Since October, more than 370 Palestinians and three Israeli soldiers have been killed in periodic flareups.
Earlier this month, Israel killed Raad Saad, Hamas’ top military commander, in a drone strike. He was one of the architects of Hamas’ October 7, 2023 one day invasion of southern Israel, which triggered the fifth cross-border Gaza war later that month.
Israel hammered Hamas during the conflict, killing some 22,000 of its foot soldiers and commanders and seriously degrading its military capabilities. Hamas, however, survived the onslaught and is still standing. To Hamas, survival denotes victory.
Trump’s plan is predicated on several key elements: Hamas’ disarmament. The demilitarization of Gaza. The creation of a temporary transitional government of Palestinian technocrats responsible for the delivery of day-to-day public services. The formation of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) to destroy Hamas’ military infrastructure and ensure security. The reconstruction of Gaza.
Under the plan, which will be supervised by a Board of Peace headed and chaired by Trump, “a credible pathway for Palestinian self-determination and statehood” is envisioned should the Palestinian Authority enact substantive reforms.
Ultimately, the success of the plan hinges on one major factor — the disarmament of Hamas, a scenario that Hamas’ leadership never formally accepted and will surely resist ferociously.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel has demanded the fulfillment of this clause as a condition for moving forward into phase two of Trump’s plan. “We can do it the easy way, or the hard way,” said Netanyahu. “But in the end it will be done.”
Netanyahu is skeptical that the ISF, which presently exists only on paper, will be able, or even willing, to disarm Hamas.
He is right.
Several weeks ago, Jordan, one of its prospective members, said it would not join the ISF if it was required to participate in Hamas’ disarmament.
To be sure, Jordan has not staked out a unique position.
Potential Arab and Muslim contributors, such as Egypt, Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan, have made it crystal clear that they do not want their forces engaging in clashes with Hamas.
Husam Baran, a senior Hamas official, told The New York Times recently that Hamas would be receptive to relinquishing its arsenal of weapons only within the context of a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, a total halt of Israeli military operations in Gaza, and the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital.
Since the current Israeli government has no intention of complying with any of these demands, one can safely assume that Hamas will reject disarmament.
Without it, Trump’s plan will effectively be dead in the water, and the war in Gaza may resume.
In theory, Trump concurs with Israel’s unwavering demand that Hamas must be disarmed. In practice, he is eager to win praise and credit as a peacemaker worthy of the Nobel Prize. How his ambivalent position will play out is an unanswered question that surely worries the Israeli government.
If Israel has no alternative but to finish the job and demolish Hamas once and for all, the Israeli army will face a resilient and ideologically motivated armed group that has begun to regroup despite its tremendous losses in men and materiel.
On its side of the Yellow Line, where many of the two million Gazans live, Hamas commands the allegiance of about 20,000 fighters in possession of lighter weapons such as automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. Hamas, too, has access to approximately half of the tunnel network that Israel did not blow up during the war. Hamas’ supply of rockets has been reduced drastically, but it may be able to replenish its stocks in secret workshops.
Just as importantly, Hamas still controls towns and villages, operates checkpoints, and generates revenue by means of levying taxes on goods entering Gaza from Egypt.
In addition, Hamas has ruthlessly murdered rivals. One of its most recent victims, Yasser Abu Shabab, was the leader of a Gazan clan supported by Israel.
Hamas, in plain language, has not been defeated decisively.
Throughout the war, Netanyahu claimed that complete victory was within reach and that Israel would not accept a ceasefire unless this objective was achieved. By any yardstick, it has eluded Israel, probably because Trump pressured Netanyahu to call a halt to the war, only a month after Israel launched an offensive in Gaza City.
Netanyahu is acutely aware that the war, Israel’s longest, did not end on his terms. Hamas, though gravely degraded, still exists as an Islamic fighting organization dedicated to Israel’s destruction.